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INTRODUCTION
[Clomputer technology is a dynamic field which can quickly outpace judicial
decisionmaking. I
The rapid expansion and commercialization of the Internet left
courts facing novel legal disputes without the common law precedents
that typically guide them.2 Hearing questions of first impression with
neither statutory direction nor, in many cases, foresight into how the
Internet would evolve, courts often applied offline precedent to In-
ternet cases.3 Many of these quick-fix doctrines were ill-advised at the
time of their creation and soon became obsolete. Because the com-
mon law tradition dictates following precedent, subsequent courts
have often aggravated the problem by relying on and even expanding
these misapplied doctrines, 4 instead of re-evaluating them in light of
technological developments and a better understanding of the In-
ternet. This Note argues that the application of the trademark law
1 Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing
copyright law).
2 See Dominic Bencivenga, Cyberspace in Court: Arguments Are Part Tradition, Part Imagi-
nation, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 21, 1996, at 5; Amy Harmon, The Law Where There Is No Land: A Legal
System Built on Precedents Has Few of Them in the Digital World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at
D1.
3 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999), discussed infra Part II.
4 See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO II), No. 1:04cv507, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005), discussed infra Part III.
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doctrine of initial interest confusion (IIC) to the Internet context was
questionable at first and is certainly inappropriate today.
Trademark infringement traditionally occurs when one party uses
a mark that is identical or similar to another party's mark, creating a
likelihood that consumers will be confused as to the source or origin
of the goods or services and inadvertently patronize the wrong
merchant. 5 Yet the IIC doctrine allows a finding of infringement even
if a consumer is sure to know the actual source or origin of the goods
or services at the time the purchase is made, so long as the consumer
may have been momentarily confused. 6 The rationale behind the
doctrine is that even if consumers do not make erroneous purchases,
merchants who cause initial confusion will divert potential consumers
away from their competitors, wrongfully profiting from the goodwill
that their competitors accrued. 7 In addition, IIC can lead consumers
to expend significant amounts of time and effort before realizing their
mistake.8
The first extensions of the IIC doctrine to Internet trademark dis-
putes involved defendants using plaintiffs' trademarks in the defend-
ants' domain names or metatags. 9 A domain name designates the
address of a Web site and consists of a "second-level" domain, which is
often the name of a business or other entity, followed by a "top-level"
domain, which often indicates the nature of the Web site (for exam-
ple, ".com" to indicate a commercial Web site, or ".edu" to indicate an
educational one).10 Because domain name registration operates on a
first-come-first-served basis, disputes arose when "cybersquatters" regis-
tered domain names of famous trademarks and "squatted" on them
5 See J. THOMAS MCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 5:2, 23:1 (4th ed. 2006). Indeed, the best evidence of infringement is proof of actual
confusion, such as misdirected complaints or consumer testimony of actual confusion. See
BEVERLY W. PATrISHALL & DAVID C. HILLIARD, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES § 4.01(b), at 132 (1985).
6 See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (hereinafter Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons].
7 See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:6, at 23-26 to 23-28 (citing Grotrian v. Steinway &
Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975)).
8 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petrol. Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259-60 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding that Pegasus infringed Mobil's trademark because consumers may initially
mistake Pegasus as being affiliated with Mobil), discussed infra Part I.B.2; Grotrian v. Stein-
way & Sons, 523 F.2d at 1339-42 (holding that the plaintiffs use of the name "Grotrian-
Steinweg" infringed on Steinway & Sons' mark because consumers may initially mistake the
plaintiff for the more famous piano company), discussed infra Part I.B.1.
9 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999) ("West Coast's use of [the plaintiffs mark] in metatags will ... result in what is
known as initial interest confusion."); Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d
1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing in a domain name dispute "a brand of confusion
called 'initial interest' confusion").
10 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044.
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until trademark owners paid a ransom to buy the names back. t1
Metatags, unlike domain names, are hidden code in a Web site's pro-
gramming that may contain keywords relating to the site's subject mat-
ter. If a Web user enters such a keyword in an Internet search engine,
the site containing the metatag may appear on the list of relevant Web
sites that the search engine generates.1 2
Both domain names and metatags led to disputes in which mark
owners claimed that Internet users initially looking for their Web site
would be "diverted and distracted to a competing website" that con-
tained the same mark, causing the actual mark owners to lose custom-
ers. 13 When facing such disputes, courts seemed content to rely on
offline IIC precedent and determined that this conduct could cause
prohibited initial interest confusion. Despite the significant academic
criticism targeted at this judicial expansion of the IIC doctrine, 14
courts have continued to use the doctrine to regulate Internet trade-
mark use. 15
In contrast with the earlier domain name and metatag cases, in
which mark owners sued the company that actually used the mark in
their domain name or metatags, in a new wave of cases, mark-owner
plaintiffs seek to hold Internet search engines liable for a practice
known as "keying." Keying occurs when search engines sell keyword
search terms and program their servers to present advertising links
11 See Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000); Intermatic,
Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[C]yber-squatters ... attempt to
profit from the Internet by reserving and later reselling or licensing domain names back to
the companies that spent millions of dollars developing the goodwill of the trademark.").
12 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1045. But see infra Part II.C.2 (arguing that metatags have
no effect on search results).
13 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Indeed, some site owners
incorporate their competitors' trademarks into their own metatags, hoping that people
who search for their competitors will find their site instead. See Anthony J. Sebok, The
Invisible Borderlines of Tort on the Internet, in SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES OF E-COMMERCE 57,
63-64 (Toshiyuki Kono et al. eds., 2002).
14 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CAutozo L. REv. 105 (2005); Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest
Confusion: What Ever Happened to Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIR.
B.J. 643 (2003); Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don't Confuse Metatags with Initial Interest Con-
fusion, 29 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1349 (2002); BryceJ. Maynard, Note, The Initial Interest Confu-
sion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303 (2000);
Julie A. Rajzer, Comment, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts Are Overprotecting Trade-
marks Used in Metatags, 2001 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 427.
15 See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-40 (10th Cir. 2006);
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
116 (2005); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-26 (9th Cir.
2004); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., 319 F.3d 243, 253-54 (6th Cir. 2003); Promatek
Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002); Checkpoint Sys. v. Check
Point Software Techs., 269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001).
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when a user searches those terms. 16 Some mark owners claim that
keyed advertising may lead to initial confusion among consumers, and
courts have begun to entertain IIC claims to hold search engines that
engage in this practice liable for trademark infringement.1 7
This Note will argue that the early application of the initial inter-
est confusion doctrine to the Internet domain name and metatag
cases had a questionable legal basis and extended trademark protec-
tion far beyond the traditional purposes of trademark law. IIC in the
Internet context, unlike its offline counterpart, does not cause con-
fused consumers to expend substantial resources before realizing
their mistake. As legislative developments and practical realities have
obviated any need for the doctrine to protect companies from domain
name and metatag abuse, courts should abandon the IIC doctrine in
favor of statutory application and traditional trademark analysis. Most
importantly, the recent attempts to use the IIC analysis to prevent In-
ternet search engines from keying advertising to trademarked search
terms would not only further extend an obsolete doctrine, but also
trample on other principles of trademark law by prohibiting the fair
use of language and impeding valid competition.
Part I of this Note provides a background in trademark law, focus-
ing on how courts applied the IIC doctrine before the emergence of
Internet trademark issues. Part II discusses how courts began to apply
the doctrine to Internet cases involving domain name and metatag
disputes, assesses the questionable legal basis for the extension, and
suggests why courts no longer need to apply the doctrine to resolve
those disputes. Part III examines attempts to further expand the IIC
doctrine to prevent search engines from keying advertisements to
search terms, criticizes some of the case law on the topic, and argues
that an expansion to keying is not necessary to protect either mark
owners or consumers and would improperly restrict legitimate fair
use.
I
TRADEMARK LAW BEFORE THE INTERNET
Trademark law is a branch of the law of unfair competition' 8 that
U.S. courts originally adopted almost intact from the British common
law.1 9 Eventually, Congress codified trademark law under the Trade-
16 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072 (C.D.
Cal. 1999).
17 See infra Parts 1ILA-B.
18 See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:7, at 2-12.
19 See PATTISHALL & HILLIARD, supra note 5, § 1.01, at 3.
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mark Act of 1946, popularly known as the Lanham Act.20 Setting the
standard for trademark protection, the Lanham Act prohibited the
use of a mark that is "likely to cause confusion" as to the origin or
sponsorship of goods or services. 21
A. Traditional Trademark Policies
Common law trademark protection was intended to prevent
merchants from defrauding consumers by palming off their goods as
those of another.22 Mark owners gained trademark rights not because
they had created the marks, but because they happened to be
"strongly motivated to vindicate the broader public interest" in
"preventing consumer deception." 23 Despite these noble beginnings,
courts came to recognize that trademark law also protects mark own-
ers' investment in the goodwill associated with their marks.24 Thus,
most courts now view trademark law as serving two distinct goals: pro-
tecting consumers' expectations about the source of the goods or ser-
vices they are purchasing, as well as protecting mark owners'
proprietary interests in their marks. 25
While trademark law may serve both interests, the public interest
in protecting consumer expectations appears primary-the private
mark owner benefits as a mere incident of the enforcement of the
public interest.26 The way trademark disputes are litigated reflects
this goal:27 Plaintiffs present themselves as "vicarious avengers" of the
20 Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000
& Supp. III 2003)).
21 Id. § 1125(a)(1).
22 See, e.g., Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546 (1891) (observing
that the use of another's trademark "deceiv[es] the public, by inducing the public to
purchase the goods and manufactures of one person supposing them to be those of
another").
23 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMoRY LJ. 367, 417 (1999).
24 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:15.
25 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999); Matador
Motor Inns, Inc. v. Matador Motel, 376 F. Supp. 385, 390 (D.N.J. 1974) ("The trademark
statutes were devised to: 1) protect the businessman in his property rights to the mark, and
2) protect the public.").
26 See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that the intent of the Lanham Act was "to protect consumers against decep-
tive designations of the origin of goods" rather than to give a "trademark's owner ... a
complete monopoly over its use, including its functional use, in commercial merchandis-
ing"). But see Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) ("The
Act's purpose ... is exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class ....").
27 SeeJames Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1976) ("In the consideration of evidence relating to trademark infringement.... a court
must expand [beyond] the ... one-on-one, contest-between-two-sides, approach. A third-
party, the consuming public, is present and its interests are paramount.").
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public's right not to be misled instead of as self-interested businessper-
sons claiming that their rights have been trampled.28
Although courts sometimes refer to marks as "property" rights,
2 9
that classification itself can create confusion.30 Unlike intellectual
property such as copyrights and patents, whereby ownership is
granted to protect creative products, the proprietary interest in a
mark is not "a right in gross"31-it cannot be separated from the prod-
uct or service the mark is used to promote.3 2
Although some have decried the notion of trademark as prop-
erty,33 the ownership of a mark does confer an exclusive right that the
owner can assert against anyone else. 34 Yet, while one may "own" a
mark, the bundle of rights associated with that ownership is far differ-
ent from other types of property:
The owner of the mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to
which the mark is applied from being confused with those of others
and to prevent his own trade from being diverted to competitors
through their use of misleading marks. There are no rights in a
trade-mark beyond these.3 5
Thus, mark owners do not have the absolute right to control their
marks; traditional trademark law only grants owners protection from
competitors using their mark in confusing or misleading ways.
B. Initial Interest Confusion in the Offline World
Courts did not create the IIC doctrine in the Internet era, but
originally applied the doctrine, albeit sparsely,36 to cases in which con-
sumers may have given a merchant some unearned initial credibility
because the merchant's use of a mark confused the consumers into
28 See, e.g., Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799
F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that "[c]ongressional policy appears to encourage
commercial companies to act as the fabled 'vicarious avenger' of consumer rights" (quota-
tion omitted)); McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:33, at 2-58.
29 See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ("The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitu-
tionally cognizable property interests-notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of
trademarks, which are the 'property' of the owner because he can exclude others from
using them.").
30 See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:14, at 2-30 to 2-31.
31 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
32 See id.
33 See, e.g., PAYrISHALL & HILLIARD, supra note 5, § 1.01 [A], at 6 (arguing that calling
trademarks "property" is a "dubious notion"); Lunney, supra note 23, at 372-73 (warning
that property-based trademark protection may create unjustified monopolies).
34 See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 ("Trademark law ... confers private rights,
which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a bundle of such
rights." (quotation omitted)); McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:14, at 2-29.
35 Indus. Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937).
36 See Rothman, supra note 14 , at 109 & n.10 (citing cases).
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inferring an association with another company. The notion that pre-
sale confusion alone could give rise to trademark infringement, even
if the consumers knew which company they were dealing with at the
time of a sale, stretched traditional trademark policy.
1. Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons
In what is often referred to as one of the first cases to recognize
the initial interest confusion doctrine,37 the Second Circuit held in
Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons that even if consumers are sophisticated
enough to know at the time of purchase who the actual maker of a
product is, infringement can still occur if the seller uses a mark that
draws initial interest because of its confusing similarity to a competi-
tor's mark.38
Steinway & Sons had sold pianos in the United States under the
marks "Steinway" and "Steinway & Sons" since the mid-1800s. 39 In
1952, Grotrian, a German company in direct competition with Stein-
way & Sons,40 began selling pianos through an American distributor
under the mark "Grotrian-Steinweg". 41 The Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding that Grotrian had infringed Steinway &
Sons' trademark given the similarity of the marks.42 While the pur-
chasers may be sophisticated enough to realize that the two compa-
nies were not the same and consequently were not likely to be
deceived into purchasing the wrong piano,43 the buyer "may satisfy
himself that the less expensive Grotrian-Steinweg piano is just as
good."44 The court "decline[d] to hold" that only "confusion at the
time of purchas' was required to find infringement. 45
2. Mobil Oil v. Pegasus Petroleum
In Mobil Oil v. Pegasus Petroleum, Mobil Oil claimed that bulk-oil
trading company Pegasus Petroleum's name infringed on Mobil's fly-
ing Pegasus symbol. 46 As in Grotrian,47 though the court recognized
37 See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:6, at 23-26 to 23-28. The case has this reputation
despite the fact that it did not actually use the phrase "initial interest confusion." See, e.g.,
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-40 (10th Cir. 2006).
38 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975).
39 See id. at 1333-34.
40 See id. at 1340.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 1339-40.
43 Purchasers of expensive pianos are "sophisticated" and thus sure to notice the dif-
ference in name, typeface of the mark on the piano, and price. See Grotrian v. Steinway &
Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
44 Id. at 1341.
45 Id. at 1342.
46 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petrol. Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1987).
47 See 523 F.2d at 1341.
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that sophisticated customers such as bulk-oil purchasers were unlikely
to be confused about the identity of the company from whom they
were purchasing, some initial confusion might have occurred, causing
injury to Mobil. 48 That is, although customers would not ultimately
mistake Pegasus for Mobil, customers might grant Pegasus some "cru-
cial credibility during the initial phases of a deal. ' 49 That possibility
alone sufficed to prove trademark infringement.
50
3. Analyzing the Offline IIC Cases
Both the Grotrian and Mobil courts purported to apply the Second
Circuit's traditional eight-factor infringement test, which originated in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.5I The Polaroid test, however, is
structured to evaluate the likelihood that purchasers would be con-
fused at the time of sale. While both courts noted that confusion at
that point will be unlikely, they nonetheless found infringement
merely because the similarity in marks may have caused the initial in-
terest, even if not the purchase itself.
52
While offline 1IC represented a judicial expansion of traditional
trademark doctrine's goal of preventing consumer deception, expan-
sions in trademark law are often necessary to protect both consumers'
and mark owners' interests. 53 Though finding infringement based on
IC may not be entirely consistent with the "palming off' rationale for
trademark protection, 54 IC-causing use could harm both mark own-
ers and consumers-the two groups trademark law is designed to pro-
tect. IIC clearly injures mark owners whenever it leads consumers to
opt for competitors' products. This type of IIC can also raise consum-
ers' search costs, frustrating one of the vital consumer-protection
48 See Mobil, 818 F.2d at 260.
49 Id. at 259.
50 See id.
51 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). The test considers the following factors:
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2) the degree of similarity between
the two marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the products or services;
(4) the existence of actual confusion; (5) the likelihood that the plaintiff
will "bridge the gap" between the two markets; (6) the defendant's good
faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the defendant's product; and
(8) the sophistication of the purchasers.
Mobil, 818 F.2d at 256 (citing Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495).
52 Mobil, 818 F.2d at 259; Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342.
53 For example, traditional trademark theory might fail to protect against counterfeit
designer goods. Because of the high price consumers expect to pay for such goods, any
consumer purchasing the less expensive counterfeits is unlikely to be confused into believ-
ing they are real. See Lunney, supra note 23, at 404-05. Instead, courts finding trademark
infringement rely on the confusion that onlookers might experience: They may mistakenly
believe the goods are authentic. See id.
54 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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goals of trademark law.55 If a consumer, initially interested due to a
mistake about a merchant's identity, ultimately declines to purchase
from the impostor, the consumer has wasted time with a company
without ever intending to patronize it. Moreover, even a consumer
who, after being initially confused, knowingly purchases from an im-
postor may still suffer harm, as the purchase may have resulted from a
desire to avoid wasting past efforts.56 Thus, offline IIC remains consis-
tent with trademark law's goal of protecting both mark owners and
consumers, despite having stretched the boundaries of trademark law.
Problems arise, however, when courts apply this precedent to an
incompatible medium. In particular, the justifications for the IIC doc-
trine offline simply do not carry over online.57 Nonetheless, lacking
any case law directly on point, courts have applied the doctrine to the
Internet, with little analysis of whether doing so furthers the tradi-
tional goals of trademark law in this new context.58
II
INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION ON THE NET: DISTRACTING
DOMAIN NAMES AND MISLEADING METATAGS
A. Brookfield v. West Coast IIC Is Just a Click Away
Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment59 was the first
major case to apply the initial interest confusion doctrine to the In-
ternet context.60 Brookfield Communications owned the trademark
"MovieBuff," which it used in connection with database software that
it marketed to entertainment-industry professionals. 61 Meanwhile, a
retail video store chain called West Coast Video had a registered ser-
vice mark for the slogan "The Movie Buff's Movie Store" and used the
term "Movie Buff" in a number of its promotions. 62 West Coast had
previously registered the domain name "moviebuff.com" and planned
on using the domain name to provide its customers with a free online
55 Cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)
("[T] rademark law.., reduces the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential consumer that this item-the item
with this mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or
she liked (or disliked) in the past." (citation and quotation omitted)); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270-71
(1988).
56 See, e.g., infra note 78 and accompanying text.
57 See infra Parts I-III.
58 See, e.g., Maynard, supra note 14, at 1332-43.
59 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
60 See Rothman, supra note 14, at 117-18 ("The rarely-used [IIC] doctrine was resur-
rected and greatly expanded in Brookfield .... The holding in Brookfield ignited a firestorm
that has spread the initial interest confusion doctrine to nearly every federal circuit.").
61 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041.
62 See id. at 1042.
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database that would allow them to search for movie information. 63
Brookfield sued to enjoin West Coast from using moviebuff.com as its
domain name or using the term "moviebuff' within the site's
metatags,64 claiming that West Coast's use of the mark in reference to
a database similar to Brookfield's would confuse and divert
customers.
65
The court began its inquiry by analyzing the domain name ques-
tion, applying the Ninth Circuit's traditional eight-factor likelihood-of-
confusion analysis. 6 6 The court determined that "moviebuff.com" was
similar to "MovieBuff," that the two were direct competitors in provid-
ing searchable movie databases, and that they used similar sales chan-
nels: Web sites. 67 Based on these findings, the court held that the
domain name infringed Brookfield's trademark, and affirmed the pre-
liminary injunction barring West Coast's use of the domain name.68
As the court disposed of the domain name issue using traditional like-
lihood-of-confusion analysis, the court did not address whether the
use of a trademark in domain name would cause initial interest
confusion. 69
Next, the court evaluated Brookfield's claim that West Coast's use
of "moviebuff.com" or "moviebuff" in the metatags of West Coast's
Web site would constitute infringement. The court believed that West
Coast's use of "moviebuff' in its site's metatags would cause West
Coast's site to appear on a list of search engine results for "moviebuff"
along with Brookfield's site. 70 Actual confusion would be unlikely, the
court recognized, because a user who entered a search could then
scan the results list and choose the desired site. 71 Further, the domain
name westcoastvideo.com would appear when the user clicked on a
result link, immediately alerting the user that the site was not Brook-
63 See id.
64 For an explanation of metatags, see supra text accompanying note 12.
65 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043.
66 See id. at 1053-54 (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th
Cir. 1979)). The test is similar to that of other circuits. Compare Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at
348-49, with, e.g., Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1983), and
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). See supra note 51
for a list of the eight factors.
67 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055-57.
68 See id. at 1058. Moviebuff.com no longer hosts either Web site; in fact, the domain
name appears to be up for sale. See Whois Record for Moviebuff.com, http://whois.do-
maintools.com/moviebuff.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
69 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054-61. When the same court faced another domain
name dispute just a few months later, instead of relying solely on the traditional Sleekcrafl
factors to analyze the domain name question as it did in Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit ex-
tended the IIC doctrine to domain names by applying a version of the Sleekcraft test modi-
fied to consider IIC. See Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110-11
(9th Cir. 1999).
70 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
71 See id.
2006] 1353
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
field's. 72 Nevertheless, the court found that even in the absence of
any confusion, West Coast's use of "moviebuff" in its metatags would
allow West Coast to benefit from the goodwill Brookfield had accrued
in its "MovieBuff" mark.73 The court reasoned that consumers origi-
nally looking for Brookfield's site might happen upon West Coast's
and "simply decide to utilize West Coast's offerings instead."74 This
possibility constituted initial interest confusion sufficient for a finding
of infringement. 75
Explaining its decision, the court analogized the information su-
perhighway to a hypothetical situation in which Blockbuster had
placed a billboard advertisement on the side of a physical highway,
advertising that its competitor West Coast Video was located at the
next exit. 76 When patrons exited the highway and looked for West
Coast Video, they would find Blockbuster there instead. 77 Customers
would likely decide that it was "not worth the trouble to continue
searching" and patronize Blockbuster, the store closest to them.78 At
the time they made their purchases, they would not be confused
about where they were shopping, yet Blockbuster would have caused
actionable initial interest confusion by misappropriating West Coast's
goodwill and diverting their potential customers.79
B. Brookfield: Misapplying Precedent, Ignoring Trademark Goals
1. Stretching the Offline Cases
The Brookfield court relied on Mobil and Grotrian for the proposi-
tion that confusion at the time of purchase was unnecessary for in-
fringement.80 While all three cases did indeed present situations in
which a customer would be able to clarify any initial confusion before
the time of sale, the parallels between the facts of Brookfield and those
of Grotrian and Mobil end there. The offline decisions involved cases
in which there was confusion at some point during the process of de-
ciding to patronize the company. The Grotrian court made clear that
piano purchasers may have initially inferred a connection between the
Steinway and Steinweg companies, giving Steinweg a level of
unearned credibility.8 ' Similarly, in Mobil, bulk oil purchasers might
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 Id.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 1064.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 1063 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petrol. Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260
(2d Cir. 1987); Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975)).
81 See Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342.
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not have considered dealing with an unknown company like Pegasus
unless they had believed there was some connection with Mobil, an oil
giant.8 2 That initial misperception could have led the purchasers to
afford Pegasus undue credibility and listen to its sales pitch.8 3 These
IIC cases involved both the presence of confusion and the misappro-
priation of goodwill in famous marks. Brookfield, on the other hand,
dispensed with the requirement that confusion exist at any point, in-
stead finding IIC based merely on the potential that West Coast might
receive some benefit from a mark registered to Brookfield.8 4
2. Economic Justifications
The offline cases' application of IIC entailed a level of consumer
protection missing from Brookfield. Implicit in the offline decisions
was an understanding that potential purchasers, though they may
eventually discover which company they are actually dealing with, will
have expended much time and effort and, in effect, may be cutting
their losses by settling for the impostor.8 5 In Brookfield, however, even
if some searchers were looking for Brookfield's product and managed
to click on the wrong link, the court observed that the instantaneous
appearance of the domain name "westcoastvideo.com" would correct
this error.8 6 Because any time wasted would be de minimis, users in-
terested in Brookfield's product would be unlikely to feel that they
had wasted so much time by clicking a link that seeking out the cor-
rect Web site would unacceptably raise their search costs.
Further, the use of confusingly similar marks by the defendants in
Grotrian and Mobil increased consumer search costs for those who
chose not to settle for the impostor, causing actual injury to consum-
ers and justifying the injunctions granted.8 7 The Brookfield decision,
by contrast, prevented West Coast from appearing in searches for
"moviebuff." As a result, a consumer actually looking for West Coast's
site who was familiar with its "The Movie Buffs Movie Store ' 8 slogan
would be unable to find their site by searching this slogan and would
need to continue searching. Thus, Brookfield unduly increased con-
sumers' search costs, with no countervailing gain to those looking for
82 See Mobil, 818 F.2d at 260.
83 See id.
84 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
86 See Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp. 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir.
1999).
87 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
88 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042.
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Brookfield's site, who could simply choose to click on the link they
were looking for.8 9
One commentator has defended the application of the IIC doc-
trine to the Internet on economic grounds, arguing that if courts did
not protect against IIC, then "a decrease in producers' incentives to
conduct business online" would result.90 If some customers, originally
looking for one company's Web site, are diverted through IIC to a
competitor's site and ultimately patronize the competitor, the returns
on the company's investment in conducting business online are di-
minished. 91 Because some companies may lose customers due to un-
restrained IIC-causing activity, those companies will shift their
resources from online operations to brick-and-mortar outlets.92
Therefore, the author concludes, it is important for the future of the
Internet that courts enforce the initial interest confusion doctrine. 93
This economic argument relies on a severe miscalculation of the
cost differential between conducting business online and offline. It
has become a business maxim that the more operations a company
moves online, the more money it will save on overhead associated with
brick-and-mortar stores.94 It is ludicrous to suggest that the cost of
losing a tiny number of customers to competitors due to IIC would
outweigh the immense savings of conducting business online. Even if
online IIC did cause some customer diversion, a rational company
would not respond by forgoing its online operations.95
89 See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777 (2004) (arguing that expansive trademark protec-
tion on the Internet is counter to trademark law's goal of reducing consumer search costs).
90 See Note, Confusion in Cyberspace- Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest Confu-
sion Doctrine, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2387, 2401 (2004).
91 See id. at 2401-02.
92 See id. at 2402-03.
93 See id. at 2400-2403, 2410.
94 See, e.g., A Little Local Difficulty, ECONOMisT, July 8, 2000, at 62 (reporting that Ora-
cle, the second-largest software company in the world, claimed to have saved almost $1
billion in overhead costs largely by moving sales from a live sales force to its Web site);
Robert D. Hof, Those Mighty Mini-Dots, Bus. WK., Feb. 19, 2001, at EB 56 (reporting that
one small business saved 90% on overhead by closing its physical locations and doing busi-
ness exclusively online).
95 When one considers the example the proponent actually cited, two competing car
rental agencies, see Note, supra note 90, at 2401-03, the absurdity of the argument becomes
even more apparent. The cost savings resulting from customers comparing prices and
reserving rental cars twenty-four hours a day online, as opposed to speaking to agents in
person or over the phone, would easily outweigh any loss of business from the supposed
loss of some customers to competitors' Web sites. For additional flaws with the argument,
see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 820 n.180.
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3. Next Exit: Bad Analogy
Brookfield's analogy to the billboard that intentionally leads con-
sumers to the wrong highway exit9 6 fails to distinguish between online
and offline business. The highway-exit scenario resembles Grotrian
and Mobil in that consumers may patronize the company that misled
them instead of wasting additional resources continuing their
search.9 7 In the Internet context, however, the loss of resources a con-
sumer suffers when arriving at the wrong Web page is hardly compara-
ble to that caused by the hypothetical billboard: A consumer can click
the back button and return to the correct location at essentially no
cost.9 8
Further, any harm that the defendant in Brookfield caused bears
no resemblance to the fraudulent trademark use in the billboard hy-
pothetical. The billboard would mislead drivers, who, upon seeing a
billboard advertising a particular store, would expect to find that very
store at the exit specified. In contrast, consumers searching online
expect to see results listing various links to Web pages, from which the
consumers can then actively choose to click.99
4. The Effect of Brookfield: IIC All Across the Net
Despite the significant academic criticism it has generated, 0 0
most courts seem to have accepted Brookfield's premise as a straightfor-
ward solution to a difficult problem. While two circuits have ques-
tioned the initial interest confusion doctrine, neither has explicitly
96 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
98 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1036 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) ("[T]he billboard analogy has been widely criticized as in-
applicable to the internet situation, given both the fact that customers were not misdi-
rected and the minimal inconvenience in directing one's web browser back to the original
list of search results."); Shannon N. King, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: Brookfield Communi-
cations, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 325 (2000).
99 See King, supra note 98, at 326 ("Search engine users may enter a search request
using a trademark in the hopes of finding sites representing products similar to the prod-
uct represented by the mark in addition to the site belonging to the owner of the mark.").
For more analogous scenarios demonstrating why IIC should not apply when there is only
momentary confusion and the consumers chose their preference, see infra Part III.C.3.
10 See supra note 14. Interestingly, many published articles analyzing IIC and Brookfield
were written by students, perhaps signaling that the younger scholars feel more attuned to
how the Internet works than judges or academia as a whole. See id.
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rejected it,101 and until recently, most other circuits that had ad-
dressed the issue had accepted and applied it.102
Faced with the new and growing problem of Internet trademark
disputes, and without much other precedent to guide them, courts
not only accepted Brookfields application of the IIC doctrine to
metatags but also expanded it to cover all other Internet trademark
usage contexts. Some courts have followed Brookfields lead in finding
the traditional trademark factors "not well-suited" for the Internet
context,10 3 applying a distinct IIC analysis instead. 10 4 Others, while
embracing the doctrine, have merely added it to the traditional list of
factors.' 0 5 Aside from the relatively uncontroversial brick-and-mortar
IIC cases such as Grotrian and Mobil, courts have now applied the IIC
doctrine to enjoin the use of trademarks in metatags, 10 6 domain
names,10 7 and keywords used to trigger banner ads,' 08 sponsored
links, 109 and adware. 110
101 See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (declining to
enter the initial interest confusion "thicket") (per curiam); Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs.,
902 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming a decision by the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board on traditional likelihood-of-confusion grounds while declining to address
the Board's IIC grounds).
102 See Rothman, supra note 14, at 108-09 (noting that "[a]lmost every federal circuit
has adopted the initial interest confusion doctrine" and that "no court has explicifly re-
jected it"). Although courts in the Fourth Circuit had believed that the Circuit had ac-
cepted the IIC doctrine, see infta note 216 and accompanying text, the Court of Appeals
has since stated that it has never adopted the doctrine, Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309,
316 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1772 (2006); accord infra notes 217, 220 and
accompanying text.
103 Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 n.24 (9th Cir.
1999).
104 See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO I1), No. 1:04cv507, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (identifying the traditional fac-
tors but disregarding them as inapplicable to the IIC setting).
105 See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 116 (2005).
106 See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061-65.
107 See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that a computer repair store's placement of automobile-related advertise-
ments on its nissan.com Web site caused IIC as a matter of law).
108 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that a search engine's use of trademarked search terms to trigger graphic
banner ads on results pages may cause IIC).
109 See, e.g., GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642 at *26-28 (holding that certain
sponsored links keyed to searches for "GEICO" caused IIC).
110 See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(preliminarily enjoining a software company from using another company's trademark in
its code to trigger pop-up advertising), rev'd, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). Adware is
software that often comes bundled with free programs and targets advertisements to users
based on their Internet usage. See SUSANNAH Fox, Si'vwARE, at ii (2005), available at http://
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPSpyware-Report_july_05.pdf.
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C. The IIC Doctrine No Longer Serves a Purpose
Faced with attempts by companies to use their competitors' trade-
marks to promote their own Web sites, courts have naturally found
the practice unsavory. Despite the weak basis for applying the initial
interest confusion doctrine to the Internet, courts might nonetheless
have considered the extension necessary to protect mark owners' in-
terests in an otherwise seemingly lawless Internet world. In the few
years since courts first applied the doctrine to the Internet, however,
circumstances have changed such that any original need for the doc-
trine to serve this protective purpose has vanished.
1. Congress Preempted the Doctrine for Domain Name Protection
Though most consumers find official company Web sites through
search engines, approximately half as many simply guess what the
company Web site's domain name is."' Because of this behavior,
mark owners recognized the importance of owning domain names
that included their trademarks. In some cases, other parties had al-
ready registered those domains first and would "squat" on them, offer-
ing to sell them to the company at a premium.1 12 In other cases, a
company may have set up a Web site on a domain name that included
its competitor's mark, hoping to capture the business of some custom-
ers looking for the competitor.
Courts had various options for dealing with such abusive domain
name registrations, including the traditional likelihood-of-confusion
test, 13 trademark dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
I11 See DOUBLECLICK, DOUBLECLICK'S TOUCHPOINTS III: THE INTERNET'S ROLE IN THE
MODERN PURCHASE PROCESS 3 (2005), available at http://doubleclick.com/us/knowledge_
central/documents/research/dc-touchpointsIII_0507.pdf; see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1044-45 (noting that an Internet user who is unfamiliar with a particular company's Web
site will typically guess the domain name or find it using a search engine).
112 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054-61 (finding the defendant's use of a domain
name consisting of plaintiffs mark followed by ".com" likely to cause confusion under the
traditional likelihood of confusion test).
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(FTDA),1 14 and the initial interest confusion doctrine.1 15 The Brook-
field court's use of the traditional factors as grounds for enjoining
trademark use in a domain name1 16 made clear that the IIC doctrine
was not the only option for protecting domain names. Still, when
faced with the question, many courts simply resorted to the 11C doc-
trine instead of conducting the full multi-factor analysis. 117
Responding to this uncertainty in the law, Congress passed the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in 1999.118
Under the Act, anyone who, with "a bad faith intent to profit," regis-
ters a domain that is "confusingly similar" to the trademark of another
may be forced to transfer the domain to the mark owner. 119 The Act
lists nine factors for courts to consider in evaluating whether the re-
quirement of bad faith is met.120 The factors include, among others,
whether the registrant's intent was to resell the domain for profit
rather than actually using it,121 or to divert customers from the actual
114 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). The act entitles the owner of a "famous mark" to an
injunction against another's use of the mark in a way that would dilute its distinctive qual-
ity; no showing of confusion is necessary. See id. While some courts used the FrDA to curb
cybersquatters, see, e.g., Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), the
statute is a weak basis for preventing cybersquatting, as it only protects "famous" marks and
only applies if the defendant used the mark in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (2000).
In addition, cybersquatters could argue that they do not dilute marks because they do not
use marks to identify goods or services, they merely squat on them. See INT'L TRADEMARK
Assoc., TRADEMARK LAw & THE INTERNET 233 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds., 2d
ed. 2001). The Supreme Court's decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue further weakened
the FTDA route by finding that plaintiffs must prove actual dilution for an FIDA claim.
537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003). Since Moseley, few dilution claims, online or offline, are likely
to succeed. See Linda B. Samuels, Is Dilution a Delusion , 86J. PAT. & TRADEARK OFF. SOC'V
325, 334 (2004). A bill in Congress called the Trademark Dilution Revision Act would fix
this problem by amending the FTDA to require only a likelihood of dilution. H.R. 683,
109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006). The bill, however, has "hit a snag" in the House. Internet-
Friendly Changes Made to Trademark Dilution Bill, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Apr. 27, 2006.
115 See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir.
2004); Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1999).
116 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054-61; accord supra note 69 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359,
366-67 (4th Cir. 2001), discussed infra notes 204-19 and accompanying text. While other
domain name cases have recited the factors, the courts' ultimate decisions seemed prima-
rily based on the IIC analysis. See, e.g., Nissan, 378 F.3d at 1007, 1118-19; OBH, Inc. v.
Spotlight Magazine, 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 187-91 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (analyzing the factors but
deciding that "even if users will easily recognize, upon reaching defendants' web site," that
it is not the plaintiffs site, "the use of plaintiffs' mark as the site's domain name.., creates
initial interest confusion ").
118 Pub. L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2000)); see also Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 2000)
("[T] he ACPA was passed to remedy the perceived shortcomings of applying the FTDA in
cybersquatting cases . . ").
119 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
120 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
121 See id. § 1125(d)(1) (B)(i)(VI).
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mark owner's sitet 22-the very situations courts had been using IIC to
remedy.
In passing the ACPA, Congress created a solid legislative founda-
tion for protecting trademark rights in domain names. In so doing,
Congress seemed to preempt the judicial extension of the IIC doc-
trine to trademark law. Accordingly, one recent opinion bypassed any
IIC analysis in favor of analyzing a domain name dispute solely under
the ACPA.123 In Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Redican, a suit brought by
the Native American tribe that operated Foxwoods Casino against the
registrant of the domain name foxwood.com, 124 the court recognized
weaknesses in applying traditional trademark infringement analysis to
the Internet context, 25 instead finding that the defendant violated
the ACPA. 126 That the court did not even discuss the possibility that
the defendant caused initial interest confusion suggested that the
court recognized that IIC analysis had become superfluous in the do-
main name context.1 27
But even years after Congress enacted the ACPA, some courts still
analyze domain name disputes under the IIC doctrine. 128 In SMC Pro-
motions, Inc. v. SMC Promotions, a California district court went even
further: After holding that the defendant's registration of a domain
name including the plaintiff's mark caused IIC, the court found it un-
necessary to consider whether the defendant's actions also violated
the statute. 129 Thus, the court relied on a common law extension of a
1946 statute, 130 despite the existence of legislation enacted in 1999
with the intent to clarify the law in the domain name context.
Although the initial interest confusion theory may have been a
useful doctrine for preventing the unauthorized use of trademarks in
122 See id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
123 See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Redican, 403 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Conn. 2005).
124 See id. at 188-90; see also Freedom Calls Found. v. Bukstel, No. 05 CV 5460, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19685 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2006) (analyzing a domain name dispute under
the ACPA and common law trademark infringement factors without discussing the IIC
doctrine).
125 See Redican, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 191-92 (discussing the problem of finding the requi-
site "use in commerce" for a domain name).
126 See id. at 195-97.
127 Notably, the court took an expansive view of the ACPA's reach, applying it retroac-
tively to a domain name that was registered two years before the ACPA went into effect. See
id. at 188.
128 See, e.g., Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 704, 724,
728-29 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (accepting the magistrate judge's decision that the defendant's
use of the lingerie retailer's name Victoria's Secret in the domain name victoriassecrets.net
"represent[ed] a classic case of initial interest confusion" in addition to actionable cyber-
squatting under the ACPA).
129 See SMC Promotions, Inc. v. SMC Promotions, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1136 n.14
(C.D. Cal 2005).
130 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (citing Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat.
427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000 & Supp. III 2003))).
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domain names before the ACPA, it is simply no longer necessary for
that task. Congressional action in passing the ACPA gave mark own-
ers a clear statutory basis for relief from abusive domain name regis-
trations and should have preempted courts from any further IIC
analysis. Not only is the IIC doctrine now unnecessary, but the ACPA
actually affords plaintiffs greater rights than did either the IIC doc-
trine or the FTDA, encompassing more instances of domain name re-
gistrations than were previously protected.131 With a statutory basis
for protecting mark owners from others registering domains with
their marks, the IIC analysis no longer serves any apparent purpose in
the domain name context.
2. Metatags No Longer Matter
Conventional wisdom among online-marketing experts had long
been that metatags were the most effective way to get Web sites listed
in search engines.1 32 Including metatag keywords in a Web site's pro-
gramming code would tell search engines what the site was about and
which words were relevant.13 3 Accordingly, the presumption was that
when someone searched those keywords, the site would be likely to
appear in results as relevant to the search. I3 4 Many even believed that
"[t] he more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of
the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be 'hit' in a
search for that keyword and the higher on the list of 'hits' the web
page will appear."'135
In a system in which site owners could increase traffic to their
Web sites merely by adding self-selected keywords in the form of hid-
den text on their sites, the results were predictable. Site owners
stuffed their sites with every keyword imaginable, including keywords
131 ACPA domain name protection extends to any protectable mark, regardless of
fame or likelihood of initial confusion. For example, suppose a plaintiff owns a federally
registered but obscure mark, and a defendant uses that mark in a domain name. The
plaintiff would likely have an easier time suing under the ACPA, which requires only a
showing that the plaintiff owns the mark and that the domain name was registered in bad
faith, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (2000), than proving that users are likely to search for
the plaintiff's obscure mark and be initially confused upon finding the defendant's Web
site. Nor would such a mark qualify for protection from dilution under the FTDA, given
the Act's requirement that the mark be "famous." See supra note 114.
132 See FRANK CATALANO & BUD SMITH, INTERNET MARKETING FOR DUMMIES 166 (2001).
133 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
134 See CATALANO & SMITH, supra note 132, at 166.
135 Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir.
1999); accord Charlotte Waelde, Forthcoming Internet Trade Mark Disputes?, in LAW AND THE
INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 174-75 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte
Waelde eds., 2000).
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that were trademarks of competitors. 13 6 Thus, metatag litigation was
born, and courts began to apply the IIC doctrine to the Internet.13 7
If metatags had continued to operate as the search engine op-
timizers the courts believed they were, search engines would have be-
come useless, delivering results based not on what searchers were
seeking but on which site would stuff the most metatags and keywords
into its code. Few Internet users would have any interest in using such
a search engine, as the searches would return largely irrelevant results.
Yet search engine use is at an all-time high, second only to e-mail as
the most common online activity.1 38 People clearly do find search en-
gines useful.
How can one explain this discrepancy? The answer is that courts
have been relying on an outdated understanding of search engines.
The great majority of search engines now ignore metatags. Search
engines began ignoring metatags as far back as 1997 because they real-
ized that allowing site owners to choose their own sites' keywords
would lead to irrelevant results. 139 Indeed, Google, the Internet's
most popular search engine, 40 never considered metatags in its re-
suits. 14 1 As Google has grown to dominate the search engine market,
many other search engines have adopted similar policies, sometimes
even directly licensing Google's technology for their results. 142
Instead of using metatags, search engines derive their results
from proprietary algorithms that evaluate how relevant a Web site is to
a search query. 143 The phenomenon known as "googlebombing"
proves that metatags are not part of the equation. A googlebomb is a
prank in which Web site operators can manipulate Google's search
results by linking unrelated words or phrases to the target site. 144 A
well-known example is the "miserable failure" googlebomb: When one
136 See INT'L TRADEMARK Assoc., supra note 114, at 347-49.
137 See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036.
138 See Press Release, Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & American Life Project, & Jeremy
Shermak, comScore Media Matrix, Search Engine Use November 2005 (2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPSearchData_ 105.pdf.
139 See Danny Sullivan, Death of a Meta Tag, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Oct. 1, 2002, http:/
/searchenginewatch.com/sereport/aricle.php/2165061; see also Eric Goldman, Deregulat-
ing Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 567 (2005) ("[A]lmost all search
engines have removed keyword metatags from their relevancy algorithms. Since 2002, only
one major search engine, Inktomi, still incorporates keyword metatags in its
algorithm .... ").
140 See Rainie & Shermak, supra note 138.
141 See Sullivan, supra note 139.
142 The search features on the AskJeeves, Earthlink, AOL, Netscape, and Compuserve
Web sites all use Google's search technology. See Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper
Factory, No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
143 See Spiders in the Web: Searching for Profit Has Become Highly Competitive, ECONOMIST,
May 15, 2004, at 16.
144 See Damon Darlin, Miserable Success, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 3, at 2; Marissa
Mayer, Googlebombing "Failure," GOOGLE BLOG, Apr. 16, 2004, http://googleblog.blogspot.
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searches for the words "miserable failure" in Google, the first result is
President George W. Bush's official biography, 45 even though neither
the biography nor the biography site's metatags contains those
terms. 1 4
6
While it is unclear whether metatags actually did what courts
thought they did when Brookfield was decided in 1999, it may have
been this mistaken belief that fueled the IC doctrine's place in In-
ternet jurisprudence. Now that it is clear that metatags do not influ-
ence search results and that non-IIC means can better protect domain
names, 147 one would think that plaintiffs would stop raising IIC as a
basis for claiming online trademark infringement. Yet because of
courts' reverence for precedent, this doctrine seems to have outlived
its useful existence.
III
INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION AND SEARCH ENGINE
SPONSORED LINKS
The latest extension of the initial interest confusion doctrine has
been into search engines' use of search terms to deliver targeted ad-
vertisements, a practice known as "keying." The search engines pro-
vide Internet users with a free search tool, raising revenue by selling
targeted advertising based on the search terms a user enters. 148 For
example, if a user enters a search term related to gardening, a com-
pany selling soil may want to advertise to this user and pay to have its
ad placed on the search results page. 149 This is usually a win-win situa-
tion: Internet users gain a useful and free tool, advertisers can target
com/2005/09/googlebombing-failure.html; Google Bomb, in WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Googlebomb (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
145 See Google Search Results, http://www.google.com/search?&q=miserable+failure
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
146 See Biography of President George W. Bush, http://www.whitehouse.gov/presi-
dent/gwbbio.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). Yahoo! and MSN are the second and third
most popular search engines, respectively. See Rainie & Shermak, supra note 138. While
their search algorithms are also secret, they too appear not to use metatags: Searching for
"miserable failure" on Yahoo! or MSN produces roughly similar results as on Google. See
Miserable Failure-Yahoo! Search Results, http://search.yahoo.com/search?p=miserable+
failure (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). As of this writing, pranksters with the opposite political
views seem to have won on MSN: The first result on MSN's search for "miserable failure" is
the liberal filmmaker Michael Moore's Web site, see MSN Search: Miserable Failure, http:/
/search.msn.com/results.aspx?q=miserable+failure (last visited Apr. 17, 2006), which also
contains neither "miserable" nor "failure" in its text or metatags, see Welcome to
MichaelMoore.comi, http://www.michaelmoore.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
147 See supra Part II.C.1.
148 See Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (noting that 96% of Google's revenues
during one quarter were from advertising).
149 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir.
2004).
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consumers who may be interested in their products, and search com-
panies earn revenues in the process.
Yet problems arise when the search term is not a generic term,
like "soil," but rather a brand name or trademark, like "Miracle-Gro."
As with metatags, keying raises the possibility for companies to use
competitors' marks to attract users who are searching for a competi-
tor's product. Not surprisingly, mark owners try to prevent this, claim-
ing that such advertising causes initial interest confusion.
A. Playboy v. Netscape. "Click Here" Confusion
The first major case to deal with the search engine question was
Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape.150 Netscape, which at that time ran a
search engine co-branded and programmed by Excite Communica-
tions,151 sold banner advertising based on groups of keywords. 152 Net-
scape's adult-oriented keyword group included "playboy" and
"playmate," trademarks of Playboy Enterprises. 153 Whenever a user
searched for either term, graphic, adult-oriented banner advertise-
ments for Web sites that competed with Playboy would appear on the
user's computer screen. 154 The banner advertisements merely read,
"Click here," without revealing who their sponsors were or explaining
where clicking would bring users. 155
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendants, finding that the banner advertisements
were likely to cause initial interest confusion, infringing on the plain-
tiff's marks. 156 Users seeking Playboy's Web site might be initially con-
fused and believe that clicking on the banners would bring them
there.' 57 Once diverted to other sites, they would realize that the
page they were viewing was not the official Playboy site, but might
nevertheless be content to use the competitor's site instead.' 58
1. A Return to Confusion Analysis
Although the Ninth Circuit compared its IIC analysis to that in
Brookfield, a close reading shows that the court retreated from some of
Brookfields overstatements. The Playboy court seemed particularly in-
150 Id.
151 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072 n.1
(C.D. Cal. 1999). Netscape.com's current search function is "enhanced by Google" search
technology. Netscape.com, http://www.netscape.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
152 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 1025.
156 Id. at 1034.
157 See id. at 1025.
158 Id. at 1024-26.
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fluenced by evidence that the banner advertisements that appeared
when Playboy's marks were searched said only, "Click here," and did
not indicate their actual sponsors. The court believed that the ads
thereby created a likelihood that consumers would click the banners
believing them to be sponsored by Playboy.159 Thus, the presence of
confusion was essential to the court's analysis in Playboy. In contrast,
Brookfield held that actionable IIC could exist so long as there was a
potential diversion of goodwill-even when the circumstances indi-
cate that there would be no possibility of confusion. 160
In another backtrack, whereas Brookfield adopted a specialized IIC
analysis based on the possibility of diversion and dispensed with the
Ninth Circuit's traditional eight-factor Sleekcraft test,161 Playboy-de-
spite heavily citing Brookfield as the source for the "likelihood of initial
interest confusion" test 162-actually applied Sleekcraft factor by fac-
tor.16 3 If the court had actually applied its Brookfield diversion-based
IIC precedent, then the mere showing that competitors were using
Playboy's marks in a way that potentially diverted even unconfused
consumers would have sufficed to prove infringement. It would be
irrelevant whether the banners were labeled or if there was sufficient
confusion under the eight-factor Sleekcraft test, as the Brook field version
of the IIC doctrine requires neither. 164
That Judge Marsha Berzon concurred in Playboy despite rejecting
Brookfields IIC precedent further suggests that the court did not actu-
ally rely on Brookfield. In Judge Berzon's view, Brookfield was wrongly
decided, as its diversion standard absurdly "expand[ed] the reach of
initial interest confusion from situations in which a party is initially
confused to situations in which a party is never confused." 165 YetJudge
Berzon concurred in the court's judgment in Playboy, likely because
the Brookfield analysis was irrelevant to the facts of the case. 166 Despite
the majority's lengthy IIC discussion, its decision did not rely on Brook-
field but actually depended on the Sleekcraft factors and the intention-
ally confusing "Click here" banners.
159 See id. at 1033.
160 See Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-65 (9th
Cir. 1999).
161 Id. at 1062.
162 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025-26.
163 Id. at 1026-29.
164 Compare Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 n.24 ("Because we agree that the traditional
eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the metatags issue, we do not attempt to fit
our discussion into one of the Sleekcraft factors."), with Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026 ("Although
analogies to Brookfield suggest that [Playboy] will be able to... defeat summary judgment,
we must test [Playboy] 's theory using this circuit's well-established eight-factor test... to be
certain.").
165 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
166 Cf id. at 1036 ("The degree to which . .. Brookfield affects this case is not clear to
me.").
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2. The Right Approach by the Wrong Name
Despite its IIC rhetoric, the Playboy majority's finding of infringe-
ment based on a likelihood of confusion demonstrates that courts can
protect trademarks under a traditional analysis, even in the context of
search engine sponsored links. By requiring a likelihood of confusion
instead of merely a possibility of diversion, Playboy did not protect
against the kind of IIC on which Brookfield focused; it protected con-
sumers only from misrepresentation. By saying nothing more than
"Click here," without providing any informative labeling, the ads mis-
represented where they would lead searchers.
Playboy, then, does not prohibit search engines from displaying
competitors' ads next to the results of searches for trademarked
terms, but merely requires that advertisements of that sort are not de-
signed to mislead users into believing that the ads are associated with
the mark owner. This is not a novel concept: Traditional trademark
law proscribes the misrepresentation of one's goods or services as
those of another. 167 As one would expect, the same applies to the
misrepresentation of a Web site. With the traditional analysis suffi-
cient to protect Internet consumers, the Brookfield court's extension of
IIC to the Internet was at best superfluous.
Not only is the deception-based model more faithful to the stat-
ute, 168 but it also more accurately reflects how people search online.
A search engine user who searches for a trademarked term is not nec-
essarily seeking the mark owner's official site. The user expects the
search to yield many results, including the mark owner's official Web
page as well as others. 169 If the search engine does lead the user away
from the mark owner's site to other results, the user knowingly ac-
cepts this diversion, not only by using a search engine in the first place
but also by clicking on the link to the other site.
Only when the diversion caused by sponsored links is caused by
misrepresentation or confusion, as was the case with the unmarked
banner ads in Playboy, should the mark owner have a valid claim. By
finding infringement only when there was diversion due to confusion,
Playboy adopted a logical approach to sponsored-link disputes. By re-
quiring not merely diversion alone but diversion caused by confusion,
the Playboy court wisely returned to the pre-Internet analysis, accord-
167 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Indeed, intentional misrepresenta-
tion such as this reminds one of the obviously infringing billboard analogy raised in Brook-
field. 174 F.3d at 1064. The IIC doctrine is hardly necessary to curb such intentional
deception. See supra Part II.B.3 (criticizing the analogy).
168 The Lanham Act describes infringement as use of a mark that is "likely to cause
confusion," 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (A) (2000), and makes no mention of voluntary diver-
sion, see id. § 1125.
169 See King, supra note 98, at 326; Rajzer, supra note 14, at 460.
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ing to which the IIC doctrine becomes relevant only if some confusion
is likely to occur.17 0
B. GEICO v. Google
Although the Playboy court shied away from the broad expansion
of the IIC doctrine in Brookfield, other courts have continued to rely
on Brookfield when analyzing Internet trademark issues, requiring only
diversion and declining to apply the traditional confusion factors. In
GEICO v. Google, a case factually similar to Playboy in that it also in-
volved a search engine's sale of advertising based on searches of a
trademarked keyword, a Virginia district court made no mention of
the Playboy analysis,1 71 instead citing the Ninth Circuit's older Brook-
field opinion for the proposition that the "traditional factors are not
really applicable in this case" and that "distraction or diversion of a
potential customer" suffices to prove infringement based on IIC.172
Reflexively applying Brookfieldas diversion-based IIC doctrine, the
GEICO court relied on one precedent that was quickly reversed1 73 and
another that has since been reinterpreted, 174 ignored the ways people
actually use search engines, and failed to consider whether the search
engine use qualified for a fair use defense.
1. A Primer on Google AdWords
Despite being a relative latecomer to the search engine business,
Google has quickly grown into the most popular search engine1 75 and
"the hottest of all Internet companies." 176 Google provides Internet
170 See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the pre-Internet IIC cases, which required a likeli-
hood of actual confusion instead of a possibility of mere diversion). While this Note agrees
with this aspect of the analysis, it argues that Playboy is still flawed on other grounds. See
infra Part III.C.4.b.
171 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICOI1), No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18642 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005). In denying an earlier motion to dismiss, Gov't Em-
ployees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO 1), 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004), the
court did cite Playboy, but only on the threshold question of whether the use of a mark in
the search engine context is use in commerce under the Lanham Act, id. at 703 (citing
Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1024).
172 See GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *14.
173 See infra Part III.C.1.
174 See infta Part III.C.2.
175 According to a survey by comScore Media Metrix, Google received more "unique
visitors" than did any other search engine in October 2005. Rainie & Shermak, supra note
138. Ironically, Google fears that its own popularity, which has almost made "googling" a
generic synonym for "conducting a Web search," may cause the company to lose its trade-
mark and diminish its brand identity. See Google Inc., Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), at 10 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/dsl.htm.
176 Saul Hansell, AOL Choice of Google Leaves Gates the Outsider, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2005, at Cl. This Note focuses on Google AdWords because of the company's dominance,
but the same analysis would apply to any similarly functioning sponsored link program.
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users with a search utility that returns lists of Web pages it considers
relevant to the keywords queried by a searcher. Instead of charging
users for this service, Google earns revenue through its AdWords ad-
vertising program. The AdWords program allows advertisers to bid on
the right to have their advertisements appear when certain keywords
are searched, targeting their ads at consumers they believe may be
interested in their goods or services. The advertisements appear next
to the main search results in a separate column labeled "Sponsored
Links." 177 Google sold more than $1 billion in these sponsored links
in just the last three months of 2004.178
2. Google's Trademark Trouble
While most keywords searched are generic words, users some-
times search for trademarks, such as brand names) 79 Some compa-
nies determined that an effective way to target their desired markets
would be to advertise when an Internet user searches for their com-
petitors' names or brands. 180 Many mark owners understandably
would prefer that their competitors not be able to target customers in
this way. As a defense, some mark owners have filed lawsuits claiming
that the sale of the trademark as a keyword constitutes infringement
under the initial interest confusion doctrine.181 In GEICO, for exam-
ple, when users searched for the word "GEICO," Google displayed ads
for competing car insurance companies in the "Sponsored Links" col-
umn.182 Additionally, the text of some of these ads included the word
"GEICO."1 83 Although Google's policy requires the removal of a
mark from an ad's text upon the mark owner's request,184 GEICO also
sued for damages allegedly flowing from the use of "GEICO" in the
177 See GEICO II, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *6.
178 SeeJohn Markoff & Nat Ives, Web Search Sites See Clicks Add Up to Big Ad Dollars, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at Al.
179 Even users conducting pre-purchase research more often search for generic terms
than brand names. See DOUBLECLICK, SEARCH BEFORE THE PURCHASE: UNDERSTANDING
BUYER SEARCH AcrvITy As IT BUILDS TO ONLINE PURCHASE 2 fig.2 (2005), available at http:/
/doubleclick.com/us/knowledgecentral/documents/research/searchpurchase_0502.
pdf.
180 Searchers are not necessarily looking merely for the company's official Web site;
they may be looking for other sites that contain information about the company, product
information, or simply information about the product class. See supra note 169 and accom-
panying text.
181 See, e.g., Complaint at 42-49, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-
1055 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2004).
182 See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO 1), 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02
(E.D. Va. 2004).
183 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO II), No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18642, at *4, *7-8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
184 See Google, AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure, http://www.google.com/
tmcomplaintadwords.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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text of ads from before the mark was removed or when it occasionally
slipped through. 185
After denying Google's initial motion to dismiss in GEICO,186
the court determined in GEICO II that GEICO had not presented suf-
ficient evidence to show that Google's keying sponsored links to GE-
ICO trademarks caused initial interest confusion. 18 7 However, the
court found that when those keyed ads also included GEICO's marks
in their text, that combination yielded sufficient evidence for infringe-
ment under the IIC theory. 188
C. Why Courts Should Not Follow GEICO in Evaluating
Sponsored Links Under the IIC Doctrine
1. Use of a Mark in Internal Programming Is Not "Trademark Use"
Google's first line of defense in responding to IIC challenges to
its AdWords program has been moving to dismiss based on the thresh-
old argument that "use" as a keyword does not constitute trademark use
as contemplated by trademark law.18 9 The Lanham Act protects
against infringing "use [s] in commerce . . . in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or ser-
vices." 190 Further, as trademark law exists to "prevent[ ] others from
copying a source-identifying mark,"19' Google has argued that its use
of marks as keywords takes place in its internal computer systems, in-
visible to consumers. Because such use has no source-identifying
function, it cannot be use as a trademark. 192
To the extent that this argument succeeds, it will obviate the
need for any IIC analysis: If Google's use does not constitute trade-
mark use, then any use there is cannot be an infringing one. "Pop-up"
advertisers, who also use trademarks in a manner invisible to users
185 See GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *7-8.
186 GEICO 1, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
187 See GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *25-26. The court reached this con-
clusion based on defects in GEICO's survey evidence, implying that a properly designed
survey might have proven actionable IIC. See id. at *20-26; accord infra notes 206-08 and
accompanying text.
188 GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *26.
189 See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *38 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (denying Google's motion to dis-
miss); GEICO I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702, 704 (same); Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant Google Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss at 5-9, 11, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,
No. 5:04-CV-1055 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2004).
190 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) (2000).
191 Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 158, 163 (1995); accord New Kids on
the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing the source-
identifying function as the "constant and limited" purpose of trademark law).
192 See GEICO I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702-03.
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within their internal software coding,193 have advanced similar argu-
ments and met with mixed results: Two district courts agreed that use
in internal computing was not trademark use, 194 while a third held
that it was. 195 Additionally, though the Ninth Circuit in Playboy held
that the use of keywords by a search engine to trigger advertisements
was actionable conduct,' 96 the Court did not specifically analyze
whether the claimed infringement constituted trademark use.' 97
Rejecting Google's motion to dismiss on that ground, the GEICO
court found "better reasoned" the cases holding that such use consti-
tutes trademark use. 198 In GEICO I, Judge Leonie Brinkema of the
Eastern District of Virginia 99 relied on 1-800 Contacts v. WenU, an
opinion by a judge of the Southern District of New York.200 Not sur-
prisingly, the 1-800 Contacts district court opinion-which was the only
pop-up advertisement case to hold that use in invisible coding consti-
tutes trademark use-was reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit,
which ruled that the Lanham Act is concerned with "use of trade-
marks... in a manner likely to lead to consumer confusion."20' The
"internal utilization of a trademark" to generate advertisements, how-
ever, "simply does not violate the Lanham Act."20 2 The court explic-
193 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 743-44 (E.D. Mich.
2003). Pop-up advertising software tracks the Web sites an Internet user visits and displays
pop-up advertisements for products or services in the same category as those Web sites. See
id. The software programming uses the domain names of the visited sites, often containing
trademarks, to determine which ads to display. See id. The user, however, never sees this
use taking place. See id.
194 See id. at 746-47; U-Haul Int'l v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va.
2003).
195 See 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd,
414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005).
196 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
197 The court found the defendant's use to be commercial because of the "commercial
nature of the enterprise." See id. at 1032. However, this analysis pertained to the general
nature of the use and did not analyze whether the commercial use was also a use as a
trademark. See id.
198 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO 1), 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D.
Va. 2004); see also Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, No. C 03-05340JF, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *31, *32 n.26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (denying Google's mo-
tion to dismiss, preferring to decide the question on a full record).
199 While Judge Brinkema's decision in GEICO may be of great importance to Internet
trademark law, she is likely better known for her role as presiding judge in the trial of
Zacarias Moussaoui. See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Judge Halts Terror Trial,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/03/13/AR2006031300506.html.
200 See GEICO I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (citing 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 467).
201 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 749 (2005); see also Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, No. 05 Civ. 3650, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14826, at *30-32 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) (applying 1-800 Contacts to
hold that the use of a trademark to trigger search engine advertising does not constitute
trademark use).
202 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 400.
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itly disagreed with the GEICO Idecision, stating that the GEICO court's
finding of trademark use based on its finding a presence of confusion
"puts the cart before the horse."20 3
In short, not only did GEICO I adopt the minority view among
split district courts on whether the use in internal computer systems is
actionable; the one district court opinion on which GEICO Irelied has
since been reversed. While the position that subsequent circuits will
take on this question remains unclear, the weight of authority has
clearly shifted toward finding that the use of a trademark in an inter-
nal system does not constitute trademark use and thus could never
constitute infringement. If other courts follow the Second Circuit's
reasoning, the question of whether and how the IIC doctrine applies
to Google's use will never need to be reached.
2. The GEICO Court Misread Its Circuit's Precedent: The Fourth
Circuit Disavowed the IC Doctrine
After deciding that Google's use constituted trademark use, the
court proceeded to decide whether the use was infringing. The court
first held that the traditional factors for determining whether the use
of a mark infringes were "not really applicable in this case,"204 and
instead analyzed the use under the initial interest confusion doctrine.
Citing the Brookfield definition, the court explained IIC to be the "dis-
traction or diversion of a potential customer from the Web site he was
initially seeking to another site, based on the user's belief that the
second site is associated with the one he originally sought."20 5
Attempting to prove initial interest confusion, GEICO presented
survey evidence purporting to show that consumers were confused
about which Web sites clicking on Google's sponsored links would
bring them to. 20 6 The court, however, found weaknesses in the survey
methodology including ineffective control comparison, leading ques-
tions, and distorted exhibits, any of which may have biased the survey
in GEICO's favor.20 7 Distrusting the survey, the court held that
GEICO had presented insufficient evidence to show that Google's key-
ing ads to GEICO's marks alone caused initial interest confusion. 20 8
Nonetheless, despite the survey's deficiencies, the court decided that
203 Id. at 412 (citing GEJCO I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04).
204 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO I), No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18642, at *14 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
205 Id. (citing Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Enm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064
(9th Cir. 1999)).
206 See id. at *16-20.
207 See id. at *20-25.
208 See id. at *25-26.
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the evidence was sufficient to show a likelihood of IIC with regard to
those keyed ads that also included GEICO's mark in their text.20 9
Although it might appear at first that Google won, and, in fact,
Google claimed victory,2 10 any victory achieved was quite narrow. The
court held that Google's using marks as keywords could constitute in-
fringement, but that in this case GEICO failed to produce reliable
evidence. Had GEICO presented a more reliable survey with similar
results, the court apparently would have agreed with GEICO that the
IIC doctrine prohibits Google's use of trademarked keywords.
By finding evidence of IIC lacking in this case, the GEICO court
implied that the doctrine's application would be proper in other
cases. However, it has now become clear that the Fourth Circuit,
where the GEICO court is situated, does not even recognize the doc-
trine.211 To support its application of the IIC doctrine, the GEICO
court cited its circuit's decision in People for the Ethical Treatment of Ani-
mals v. Doughney (PETA).212 In PETA, the animal rights organization
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, which used the acronym
"PETA," sued Michael Doughney, whose Web site located at peta.org
purported to represent the interests of "People Eating Tasty Ani-
mals."213 The Fourth Circuit rejected Doughney's defense of parody
and affirmed the district court decision that his Web site infringed
PETA's trademark through "initial confusion."21 4 Because the parody
was not apparent from the domain name itself, the use of PETA's
mark in the domain name was likely to cause confusion. 21 5
Implicit in PETA's holding seemed to be that the Fourth Circuit
recognized the IIC doctrine. Indeed, GEICO II cited the PETA case as
"discussing the appropriate boundaries of initial interest confusion
with regard to parody."216 Just two weeks after the district court issued
the written GEICO II opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit decided
Lamparello v. Falwell, which rejected this interpretation of PETA and
unequivocally renounced the doctrine. 217 In Lamparello, a case involv-
ing domain name parody similar to that in PETA,218 the court rejected
209 Id. at *26-27.
210 See David Drummond, Courts Signal that Google's Keyword Policy Is Lawful GOOGLE
BLOc, Aug. 17, 2005, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/08/courts-signal-that-goog-
les-keyword.html ("[T] he judge in the case ruled decisively in our favor on the issue of
keywords.").
211 See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
212 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001), cited in Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc.
(GEICO If), No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).
213 See PETA, 263 F.3d at 362-63.
214 Id. at 366.
215 See id. at 366-67.
216 GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *15 (citing PETA, 263 F.3d at 366).
217 See 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1772 (2006).
218 See id. at 311.
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the plaintiffs IIC claim, explaining that "PETA... does not adopt the
initial interest confusion theory. ... 219 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit
"never adopted the initial interest confusion theory," but rather "re-
quir[es] courts to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists
by examining the allegedly infringing use in the context in which it is
seen by the ordinary consumer."220 That context includes "the under-
lying content of the website."221 Accordingly, a link itself cannot in-
fringe unless the site to which it leads is also confusing.222
Had the Fourth Circuit issued this opinion before the district
court decided GEICO II, the analysis in the latter case would likely
have been quite different. In addition to GEICO's lack of reliable evi-
dence of confusion, the court would have had to consider the context
in which consumers see the use; finding a mere likelihood of initial
confusion would not have been sufficient. The context in GEICO was
the Internet, a medium where, as the court itself acknowledged, even
initial confusion is very limited given that users can quickly retrace
their steps by hitting the "back" buttons on their browsers. 223 Further,
because the sponsored links led only to competitors' Web sites and
not to GEICO's, the sites' content served to reduce any potential con-
fusion. 224 Thus, even aside from GEICO's deficient evidence, the
court should have dismissed GEICO's claims because, under
Lamparello's context-sensitive analysis, Google's sponsored links could
not have given rise to confusion.225
Although one can read GEICO as endorsing the initial interest
confusion doctrine with regard to search engines' keyword-based ad-
vertising, this interpretation should carry little precedential weight.
219 Id.
220 Id. (quotation and emphasis omitted).
221 Id. at 318.
222 See id.
223 See GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642 at *15. The court nevertheless applied
the IIC doctrine because of the "unique" nature of GEICO's business. Id. at *27.
224 Cf Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1772 (2006) (noting that confusion is unlikely because fallwell.com's content clearly sig-
nals that it is not sponsored by Falwell).
225 Facing similar suits in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,
No. 5:04-CV-1055 (N.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 6, 2004) (alleging infringement based on Google's
keying advertisements to searches for plaintiffs mark); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wall-
paper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30,
2005) (same), one might have expected Google to use Lamparello's renunciation of IIC,
issued just two weeks after GEICO, as grounds for appealing the Virginia district court's
decision, potentially creating some appellate-level precedent specifically vindicating
Google's AdWords practices. Google, however, maintains that the only issue that mattered
to it was the use of marks as keywords, not the use of marks in ad text, which mark owners
could opt out of under Google's current policies. As Google technically won on the impor-
tant issue, there were "[n]ot a lot of good ways to appeal the part [Google] cared
about .... See E-mail from Michael H. Page, Esq., Partner, Keker & Van Nest LLP, Trial
Counsel to Google, Inc., to author (Nov. 28, 2005, 14:37 EST) (on file with author).
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First, subsequent case law suggests that Google's internal uses of
marks do not constitute trademark use and consequently cannot con-
stitute trademark infringement. Second, GEICO's own circuit has
since repudiated the doctrine in favor of the traditional likelihood-of-
confusion analysis.
3. Google's AdWords System Is Indistinguishable from Accepted
Offline Marketing Techniques
A customer asks a clerk where to find Tylenol and is directed to
Aisle Three. On the way toward the Tylenol, the customer notices the
store's generic acetaminophen-conveniently located next to the
Tylenol-and, after comparing both products, decides to purchase
the store brand. Few would argue that the pharmacy engaged in
trademark infringement by diverting a potential Tylenol purchaser.2 26
Similarly, if the store brand included the label, "Compare to the active
ingredient in Tylenol," Tylenol would not have an infringement claim
against the pharmacy. 227
The practices described do not infringe Tylenol's trademark, be-
cause the pharmacy is free to offer customers a choice as long as it
does not confuse the customers into purchasing the wrong product.
Yet when Internet consumers search for one brand, and a search en-
gine offers both the name brand and other options, the search engine
may be liable for infringement under Brookfield and GEICO.228 Fur-
ther, GEICO implies that if the advertisement on Google had included
the actual trademarked term anywhere in its text-even in a compari-
son statement such as "Save 5% over GEICO"-the search engine
would be liable for infringement, 229 whereas the equivalent offline
226 Cf Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon,J., concurring) (drawing a similar analogy to department stores); Rothman,
supra note 14, at 134-35; see also 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 749 (2005) (noting drug stores' placement of generic prod-
ucts next to brand-name products).
227 Indeed, a "Compare" statement tends to dispel confusion. See Conopco, Inc. v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing the use of a trademark on a
competitor's "Compare" statement as one factor supporting the court's holding of no
infringement).
228 Note that although the GEICO court did not find the defendant liable for infringe-
ment, the court implied that more reliable evidence could have supported a finding of
infringement. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
229 GEICO Hfound the use of "GEICO" in the text of ads to be infringing despite citing
numerous problems with the plaintiff's survey. See GEICO II, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642,
at *26-27. Oddly, however, the court gave no hint as to how the offending ads used the
marks in their text-whether for innocuous comparisons ("Save 5% Over GEICO") or mis-
leading statements ("Click Here for GEICO"). See id. Instead, the court's decision seems
to be a blanket prohibition on the use of any mark in the text of a competitor's ad if the ad
was generated by a search for that mark. See id.
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statement would be protected if truthful. 230 No clear reason exists for
this distinction.
4. Search Engines' Keyed Advertising Systems Are Protected Under the
Nominative Fair Use Doctrine
Courts have generally recognized two kinds of "fair use" defenses
to trademark infringement: "classic" and "nominative." The Lanham
Act defines classic fair use as the "use, other[ ] than as a mark ... of a
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe" the alleged infringer's own goods or services.231
That is, classic fair use allows one to use trademarked words in their
literal, non-trademark meaning to describe one's own goods.232 A
split among the circuit courts arose over the question of what a defen-
dant needed to show in order to invoke the classic fair use defense;
the Ninth and some other circuits requiring the defendant show not
only that the use was descriptive, non-trademark use, but also that the
use would not cause a likelihood of confusion. 233
Nominative fair use is the use of a mark to refer to the mark's
owner rather than as a source identifier of the alleged infringer or its
products.23 4 For example, this Note can mention "Google" without
violating Google's trademark because it is using Google's name to re-
fer to Google itself rather than to imply any association between the
company and this Note. Nominative fair use typically occurs when a
defendant uses a plaintiffs mark to identify the plaintiffs goods, with
the ultimate goal of describing its own product by reference to the
plaintiff's. 2 35 The Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing set forth the test for determining whether a defen-
dant is entitled to assert a nominative fair use defense. 23 6 Instead of
230 The use of the mark in this context would alert consumers that the advertiser was
not the named company but its competitor. See supra note 227.
231 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2000).
232 See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that the defendant's use of the words "Beach Boys" was not classic fair use because the
defendant used them to refer not to "boys who frequent a stretch of sand beside the sea"
but to the famous music group of that name).
233 See KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, 543 U.S. 111, 116-17 (2004)
(describing the circuit split); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1029 (9th Cir. 2004) ("A fair use may not be a confusing use.").
234 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 307-08 (9th Cir.
1992); see also McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:11, at 23-55 (explaining that nominative use is
so called "because it 'names' the real owner of the mark").
235 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2002).
236 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). Though litigants have raised the nominative fair
use defense most frequently in the Ninth Circuit, district courts throughout the other cir-
cuits have also recognized the defense. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending-
tree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing cases). While the Third Circuit
recently adopted a slightly modified test for nominative fair use, see id. at 222, it appears
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applying the standard likelihood-of-confusion factors, the court finds
for the defendant if the following conditions are met:
First, the [plaintiffs] product or service in question must be one
not readily identifiable without use of the trademark;23 7 second,
only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service;2 38 and third, the user
must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. 239
Like the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of classic fair use, the New Kids
test was structured to require the defendant claiming nominative fair
use to show that the use would not cause confusion. 240
a. The Supreme Court's Clarification of Fair Use Undermines the
IIC Doctrine
In KP Permanent Make-Up, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's approach to the fair use doctrine. 24 1 Addressing only classic
fair use, the Court held that the fair use defense rebuts an infringe-
ment claim even if the use may cause some confusion. 242 Because fair
use is an affirmative defense invoked only after a plaintiff has made a
prima facie showing of a likelihood of confusion, "some possibility of
consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use . ... "243
Though on its face the Supreme Court's decision rejects only the
Ninth Circuit's approach to classic fair use, courts have applied its
logic to nominative fair use as well. 244 That approach would require
that the Ninth Circuit's New Kids test has otherwise been generally accepted. See McCaR-
THY, supra note 5, § 23:11.
237 Though the original statement of the test in New Kids was vague as to which party
the first sentence referred to, Ninth Circuit decisions have consistently inserted "plaintiff's"
in brackets. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308).
238 New Kids explained the second prong by example: A competing soft drink company
would be entitled to a nominative fair use defense for a comparative advertisement using
the term "Coca-Cola," but only if the company did not also use the distinctive lettering
from Coca-Cola's logo. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 n.7.
239 Id. at 308.
240 See Rothman, supra note 14, at 177-78 ("New Kids explicitly limits nominative fair
use to situations in which the public is not deceived." (citing New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308)); see
also Brother Records v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a nominative
fair use defense because the defendant's use caused actual confusion); McCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 23:11, at 23-55 (noting that nominative use "is not an infringement so long as
there is no likelihood of confusion").
241 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
242 See id. at 124.
243 See id. at 121.
244 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222-23 (3d Cir.
2005) ("After that decision, it seems to us that neither classic or nominative fair use should
rise and fall based on a finding of likelihood of confusion"); Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, No. 99
C 5565, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23420, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) ("While the Supreme
Court specifically declined to address the nominative fair use defense, I am persuaded that
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the Ninth Circuit to rework its New Kids test to allow a defendant to
assert a nominative fair use defense despite the existence of some pos-
sibility of confusion. 245
Under this new approach, search engines should be able to suc-
cessfully raise fair use defenses to claims challenging keyed sponsored
links. Although classic fair use probably cannot serve as a defense to
initial interest confusion claims against search engines,2 46 nominative
fair use may be viable. The search engine is using the plaintiffs mark
as a keyword precisely because it is the plaintiffs brand name. That is,
the advertiser uses the mark to describe not the advertiser itself but
the plaintiff and its goods.
Thus, if a nominative use defense can now defeat some level of
confusion, it should afford search engines a strong defense to IIC
claims. Even courts that have applied the IIC doctrine to Internet
search engine sponsored links have acknowledged that any confusion
caused is minimal. 247 Given the minimal level of confusion that spon-
sored links may cause and the nominative character of the use-iden-
tifying the plaintiff and its brand, not the advertisers or their goods-
the fair use defense should trump the fear that any confusion may
arise.
b. Traditional Nominative Fair Use Protects Keyed Advertising
Even without extending KP Permanent Make-Up's classic fair use
logic to nominative fair use, search engines should be entitled to the
nominative fair use defense under the more restrictive New Kids test.
Applying the test 248 to the GEICO scenario, 249 (1) Google cannot read-
ily identify the GEICO company without using the trademark
"GEICO"; (2) Google used only the word GEICO rather than any of
GEICO's other marks, such as its distinctive lettering or its gecko mas-
its logic applies with similar force to defendants pursuing the defense of nominative fair
use ....").
245 See supra note 240. But see MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:11, at 23-55 (maintaining
that nominative fair use "is not an infringement so long as there is no likelihood of
confusion").
246 Sponsored links in search engines use marks to refer to the mark owners them-
selves. Thus, classic fair use, which applies only where a defendant uses a mark in its literal,
non-trademark meaning, would not apply. See Brookfield Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entm't
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting classic fair use defense because
.moviebuff' "is not a word in the English language" and thus does not have a descriptive
meaning).
247 See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc. (GEICO I), No. 1:04cv507, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at *15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) ("The risk of losing customers who
are initially confused is lessened on the Internet . because a customer can retrace his
steps almost instantaneously online.").
248 Supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
249 The nominative use defense was not actually raised in the case. See GEICO II, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642.
1378 [Vol. 91:1343
SEARCHING FOR CONFUSION
cot; (3) Google's placement of the ads under a "Sponsored Links"
heading and the fact that the links lead to Web sites of GEICO com-
petitors strongly suggest that GEICO did not endorse the use. As
Google meets all three prongs of the New Kids test, it seems entitled to
a nominative fair use defense. Prohibiting such nominative use "ha[s]
the unwanted effect of hindering the free flow of information on the
Internet, something which is certainly not a goal of trademark law. '250
Yet the one appellate case to rule on the question of nominative
fair use for search engine sponsored links rejected the defense 25 1-
and may have, amazingly enough, misread its own precedent in doing
so. In Playboy v. Netscape, the Ninth Circuit held that the defense
failed on the first prong of the New Kids test because the defendant's
search engine did not need to use the plaintiffs marks, as the defen-
dant "could use other words, besides [Playboy] 's marks, to trigger
adult-oriented banner advertisements. '2 52 Yet the first prong of the
New Kids test asks whether the plaintiff's product or service, not the
defendant's, is reasonably identifiable without using the plaintiffs
mark. 253 While it may indeed be true that the defendant could use
other terms to trigger adult advertising, the defendant in Playboy could
not reasonably identify the plaintiff company without using the plain-
tiff company's name.
Courts have generally not been so demanding, finding that de-
fendants satisfy the first prong of New Kids in the many situations in
which it is "virtually impossible" to refer to the plaintiffs product with-
out using plaintiff's mark.25 4 For example, a mechanic may advertise
that he can repair "Volkswagens" without seeking permission to use
Volkswagen's name, because of the difficulty in finding another way to
refer to that maker of automobiles. 255 While the repair shop could
avoid using "Volkswagen" by saying it can repair cars produced by a
German manufacturer whose name rhymes with "folks dragon," and
Google could avoid using "GEICO" in its sponsored links program by
selling only generic keywords, courts have not previously required
such roundabout methods when the use satisfies the second and third
prongs of the nominative use defense.
250 Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).
251 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
2004). For more background on this case, see supra Part III.A.
252 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030.
253 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
254 E.g., Horphag Research v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The
nominative fair use analysis acknowledges that it is often virtually impossible to refer to a
particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other
such purpose without using the mark." (quotations omitted)).
255 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969)).
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D. Search Engine Users Are Not Likely to Be Confused
Even assuming the validity of the initial interest confusion doc-
trine's application to sponsored links, mark-owner plaintiffs must still
prove that IIC will occur in their case. To do so, the plaintiff will need
to show that consumers are likely to click on the advertisements at
least initially believing them to be related to the mark they searched
for, causing the mark owner to lose business. But those Internet users
who feel comfortable enough to conduct business online are the same
users who are least likely to be confused by sponsored links on search
engines. Younger consumers are more likely to be confident in their
Internet abilities and are thus the group more likely to conduct busi-
ness online. 256 Further, younger users are more confident in their
ability to use search engines and to understand the difference be-
tween regular search results and sponsored links. 25 7 Given that the
demographic of consumers most likely to transact online is also the
least likely to be confused by sponsored links, the existence of any
initial confusion among Internet consumers is unlikely.
As time goes on, the number of consumers likely to be confused
by sponsored links will diminish even further. We may eventually
reach a point where the notion that anyone would misunderstand the
nature of sponsored links will seem absurd. If courts apply the IIC
doctrine now to prohibit search engines from using marks as keywords
to generate sponsored links, that precedent will be difficult to over-
turn years later, when there will likely be an even smaller possibility of
confusion to justify it. Aside from needlessly overprotecting trade-
marks, consumers will lose much of search engines' comparison-shop-
ping functionality. 258 Applying the initial interest confusion doctrine
to search engines, then, is not only unnecessary to protect companies
from supposedly confusing sponsored links, it also creates precedent
that may prevent a reassessment in the future, when initial confusion
is even less likely.
256 See DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AND DAILY
LIE, at v, 19 (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Internet-and_
DailyLife.pdf; see also DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH EN-
GINE USERS, at iii (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPSearchengine-users.pdf
[hereinafter FALLOWS, SEARCH ENGINE USERS] ("The youngest users, those 18-29 years
old .... search more often and are more confident about their search abilities.").
257 See FALLOWS, SEARCH ENGINE USERS, supra note 256, at 19.
258 Those who do the most online shopping are also the most likely to use the Internet
to comparison shop. See Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Heaviest Online Buyers Re-
present 18 Percent of Buyers, But Drive 46 Percent of Online Spending, According to
Nielsen//NetRatings (Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr
_051202.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
The initial interest confusion doctrine, though it expanded tradi-
tional trademark protection, was accepted as advancing trademark
goals when courts applied it offline. The doctrine's application to the
Internet was a quick answer to new and difficult trademark issues that
courts were ill-prepared to handle. When extending the doctrine to
the Internet, however, courts managed to prohibit not just "confu-
sion" but also mere "diversion," far exceeding the doctrine's offline
counterpart.
In addition to the theoretical problems with applying the IIC doc-
trine to trademark use in domain names and metatags, the doctrine
has been statutorily preempted for domain names and is simply no
longer necessary for metatags. Instead of questioning the propriety of
the doctrine's application, however, courts have not only continued to
rely on it but have also further expanded it, creating the bizarre situa-
tion in which trademarks receive greater protection online than
offline.
Courts should reconsider the reflexive application of the IIC doc-
trine to the Internet and instead apply traditional trademark analysis.
Though search engines' use of trademarks to trigger competitor's
sponsored links may instinctively seem improper, trademark protec-
tion cannot become ownership of language and thus should not ex-
tend to such non-confusing uses. While advertisements that
intentionally mislead or confuse users into believing that the links will
lead to a mark owner's site should certainly be enjoined, innocent
competitive conduct should not. It is fair for search engines to facili-
tate comparative advertising through the use of another's mark if the
Internet users seeing the ads are not confused. Prohibiting such use
has no legal basis, harms consumers, and stifles the Internet's develop-
ment as a vital tool for competitive commerce.
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